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Article 6

NAFTA, MOTOR CARRIERS AND
HIGHWAY SAFETY
Kathryn Dobie
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
William A. Cunningham
Air Force Institute of Technology

The signing of the NAFTA agreement signaled the beginning of increased efforts to harmonize trade between
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Unfortunately the harmonization of transportation links is lagging far behind
proposed implementation dates. This narrative describes the highway safety, and concerns expressed by
highway safety advocates and Teamsters union representatives, and documented by the GAO. The authors
propose a market based alternative to restricting transborder traffic to the narrow commercial zone presently
in place.
INTRODUCTION
The signing of the NAFTA agreement in December
1993 marked the beginning of a new era in North
American trade relations. However, the benefits of
these new trade relationships hinge on free access to
markets. While the intent of the NAFTA agreement
was to lower and in time to virtually eliminate
political and legal barriers to trade, the physical
barriers to the cross-border flow of goods remain
problematic. One physical barrier to the free flow of
goods is the lack of adequate infrastructure. It will
take a commitment and considerable financial
investment to alleviate this problem. The second
barrier is the unwillingness and/or inability of many
Mexican transportation providers, specifically motor
carriers, to meet U.S. safety and operating
standards. Expressing concerns that the planned
December 1995 opening of the four U.S. and six
Mexican border states to the free flow of traffic
would compromise the safety of American highways,
Teamsters Union representatives and highway
safety groups advocated that the border states not be
opened until the safety issue was rectified. As a
result President Clinton opted not to open the border
states to the free flow of traffic as had been
scheduled under the NAFTA agreement.

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the
safety concerns which have precipitated the present
conflict over the advisability of opening the border
states to unrestricted transportation movement or of
continuing to restrict movement to the narrow
commercial zone currently in place will be presented.
Secondly, the short and long term economic
implications of opening the border for the free
movement of motor carriers for both Mexican and
U.S. shippers and carriers will be discussed.
Following an overview of the progress toward
opening the border, the factors which have been
identified as contributing to the accident rate of
motor carriers will be examined. Data regarding
out-of-service violations for Mexican motor carriers
will then be compared to the identified accident
contribution factors. This will provide the necessary
background for extending the discussion to the
specific economic impact of motor carrier safety and
the implementation of NAFTA provisions for the free
access of motor carriers to markets in all areas of
North America.

SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW
The Government Accounting Office has conducted
two studies examining the state of safety inspections
and safety inspection procedures at the U.S./Mexican

Fall 1997

25

border crossings in California, Arizona, New Mexico,
and Texas. The first report, issued February 29,
1996, focused on providing an update on the status
of harmonizing safety regulations, operating and
enforcement practices, and the readiness of state and
federal agencies to enforce compliance with U.S.
trucking regulations (“Commercial Trucking,...”
1996). It was felt that these represented the greatest
impediment to implementing the first phase of the
NAFTA agreement which expands the free access
trade zone of the U.S./Mexican border (Exhibit 1) to
the total area of the ten border states (Exhibit 2).
The data for this report was collected between June
1995 and Jan. 1996.

At the time that this report was issued, it was
determined that enough progress had not been made
to justify expanding cross border traffic beyond the
existing commercial zone. Specific concerns which
were highlighted included the incompatibility of
trucking regulations between the U.S. and Mexico
(Exhibit 3), the lack of uniform enforcement practices
between the U.S. and Mexico (Exhibit 4), the lack of
inspection facilities on the U.S. side of the border
(Exhibit 5), and the lack of inspection on the Mexican
side of the border. The numbers of Mexican truckers
whose vehicles have been restricted from highway
service until safety violations have been remedied
has ranged from 50 to 63 percent. This high rate of
safety violations has been cited by political, union,
and consumer groups as a major cause for concern.

EXHIBIT 1
CURRENT COMMERCIAL ZONE
EXHIBIT 3
INCOMPATIBILITY OF TRUCKING
REGULATIONS
Regulation

U.S.

Mexico

Driver Hours of
Service

10 per day

None

Log Books

Required

Not Required

Computerized
Driver
Records

Required

Not Required

Front Brakes

Required

Not Required

Gross Vehicle
Weight

80,000 lbs.

97,000 lbs.

Single Axle
Weight

20,000 lbs.

22,000 lbs.

Tandem Axle
Weight

34,000 lbs.

39,600 lbs.

Vehicle
EXHIBIT 2
TEN STATE ACCESS-DECEMBER 18, 1995

*GAO/RCED 96-61 Commercial Trucking Under
NAFTA, p. 20.
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EXHIBIT 4
DIFFERENCES IN ENFORCEMENT
PRACTICES
U.S.

Mexico

Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations

Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance
(1991)

Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program

Educational Inspection
Activity (1993)

Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance

Little to no
Enforcement

Fines for Violations

Fines for Violations
Virtually Non
existent

In April 1997, the GAO issued a second report
concerning the progress made toward satisfying the
safety and inspection standards necessary to
implement the opening of

EXHIBIT 5
U.S. INSPECTION FACILITIES
California (24% of traffic)
Permanent Inspection Facilities at Otay Mesa
and Calexico
Texas
(66% of traffic)
No Permanent Inspection Facilities

Arizona
(10% of traffic)
No Permanent Inspection Facilities

the border states to the free movement of truck
traffic (“Commercial Trucking,...” 1997). By this
time, the original target date for implementation,
December 18, 1995, had already been postponed for
over a year. The focus was on inspection procedures
and safety enforcement along the border areas and
federal strategies to ensure the compliance with U.S.
safety standards by Mexican truckers. The intent

was to take a more detailed look at border inspection
facilities and practices in an effort to determine if
progress had been made toward the goal of
harmonizing and enforcing safety standards between
the U.S. and Mexico. The results of the study
indicated that California, with 24% of the truck
traffic from Mexico, was by far the most proactive of
the states in implementing inspection procedures.
The inspection facilities in Texas, with 66% of the
total truck traffic, and Arizona, with 10% of the total
truck traffic, were woefully inadequate and in some
border areas non-existent.
In addition, DOT
programs to train inspectors on the Mexican side of
the border had not produced any measurable results.

MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
Attention to the issue of motor carrier safety is not a
new phenomenon.
The public, state highway
administrators, DOT officials, shippers, and motor
carriers alike have been concerned about safety
issues for various reasons. Concerns have revolved
around such issues as actual physical safety, the
possibility of infrastructure damage, costs of
operation, and the importance of the exchange of
undamaged goods between shipper and customer
(Brandt, 1997; “Mexico’s NAFTA,...”1997; “NAFTA
Inspires NAII,...” 1996). These same issues were
raised following enactment of the Motor Carrier Act
of 1980. At that time public interest advocates
focused on the possibility that safety performance
had changed due to the new operating environment
and the number of new entrants in the industry.
There was public criticism of the rate of highway
accidents involving poorly maintained trucks
(O’Neill, 1987). This was blamed on the lack of fines
and other penalties being imposed on safety violators
by the Federal Highway Administration's Office of
Motor Carriers.
Even with the shortage of
inspectors, 30-40% of trucks that were inspected
were cited for serious safety violations involving
brakes, tires, and the size and weight of the load
(Loos and Labich, 1987).
Academic researchers who studied this problem
found that newer carriers with little experience in
the motor carrier industry had significantly higher
accident rates (Corsi, Fanara and Jarrell, 1988;Corsi
and Grimm, 1987). They also reported a higher
incidence of reported accidents involving
owner-operators. This was attributed to a general
lack of experience and inadequate maintenance,
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While these studies identified populations in the
motor carrier industry who might be more prone to
accidents, they did not identify the factors which
were most likely to contribute to the incidence of
motor carrier accidents.
Bruning specifically
attempted to identify those factors most often
associated with motor carrier accidents (Bruning,
1989). The factors which had the greatest positive
correlation with motor carrier accidents were driver
longevity and experience (.01 level of significance),
equipment defects (.05 level of significance), age of
the equipment (.10 level of significance), and the size
and financial stability of the carrier (.01 level of
significance). From this study, it could be concluded
that the profile of the carrier least likely to pose a
safety hazard would be larger, financially sound,
with newer, well maintained equipment and
experienced drivers. Interestingly, this study did not
find a significant relationship between accident rates
and whether or not the driver was self employed, e.g.
an owner-operator.
A similar effort investigated the role that excessive
speed and driver training played in the incidence of
accidents (Beilock and Capelle, 1989).
Two
contributors to excessive speed identified in this
study were thrill seeking and the over estimation of
personal abilities or vehicle capabilities. Thrill
seeking and the underestimation of personal abilities
may be conceivably linked to the lack of experience
identified by Bruning.
The likelihood of
overestimating vehicle performance capabilities may
be linked to both driver inexperience and the
condition and age of the vehicle. While these studies
have focused on different factors it is plain that those
factors are not mutually exclusive.
The preceding studies, conducted in an effort to
determine the factors affecting highway accident
rates for U.S. carriers, are as applicable as they were
when they were conducted. Factors contributing to
higher numbers of safety violations, e.g. driver
inexperience, equipment safety violations, equipment
age and the financial status of the company, apply to
Mexican carriers as well as the U.S. carriers that
were originally surveyed. A survey of the out-ofservice data collected during the GAO investigation
of border area safety violations illustrates this point.

EXAMINATION OF OUT-OF-SERVICE DATA
The average monthly out-of-service rate for U.S.
trucks inspected during fiscal year 1995 was 28%
while the average out-of-service rate for Mexican
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trucks entering the U.S. was 45%. The difference in
the rate of trucks being restricted from highway
service until safety violations are corrected serves to
underscore the concerns that opening the border
states might lead to an increase in safety related
accidents. However, these figures may overstate the
difference between the numbers of U.S. carriers
sidelined for safety violations and the numbers of
Mexican carriers sidelined for safety violations. The
Mexican sample consisted of over 25,000 inspections
out of about 3 million trucks. This sample was
primarily selected according to how likely the truck
was to be in violation. In addition, since Mexican
trucks are only allowed to travel within the narrow
commercial zone, they are most likely to be dray age
vehicles which make several trips across the border
in a single day. In contrast, the 1.8 million trucks
inspected in the U.S. sample represent a more
general cross section of the motor carrier population.
Safety violation data for drayage operations is not
available separately from inspection data for the
motor carrier population as a whole.
The GAO categorized the violations that were
commonly observed during the inspection of trucks
entering the U.S. from Mexico into four areas. (See
Exhibit 6)
Two of these categories, equipment deficiencies and
lack of driver qualifications were specifically
identified in Bruning's study as being significant
contributors to accidents. The third category, cargo,
could conceivably affect the handling quality and
performance of the vehicle. In addition, weight
factors have a detrimental effect on roads and
bridges which may indirectly contribute to accidents.
The final category is of importance in terms of
financial responsibility, but does not directly affect
truck safety.

DISCUSSION
It is important for transportation managers to
consider the consequences of opening the
U.S./Mexican border to the free flow of motor carrier
traffic. Safety is an issue that cannot be over
emphasized. From the information presented by the
GAO, it appears that due to inadequate inspection
facilities and the continuing high rate of safety
standard violations, the limited commercial zone
rules should not be expanded. Using GAO figures,
the Teamsters and highway safety advocates have
actively lobbied for the status quo.

EXHIBIT 6
COMMON SAFETY VIOLATIONS

Equipment

Structural Cracks
Poor Suspension
Faulty Tires
Non-Working Brakes
Non-Working Lights
Steering Problems
Faulty Exhaust Systems
Leaky Fuel Tanks
Non-Functioning
Emergency Equipment

Driver

Invalid Licenses
Under Age
Ix)gbook
Language
Drug Testing

Cargo

Overweight
Not Secured Properly
Hazardous Material Not
Secured Properly

Other

Insurance

However, The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance,
an association of federal, state and province officials
and industry representatives who are responsible for
motor carrier safety laws in the U.S., Canada and
Mexico, maintain that the truck safety enforcement
community is prepared to handle the levels of crossborder traffic which would result when the
commercial trade zone is increased to include the
border states.
The most obvious way to deal with truck safety
appears to be through inspection programs. With its
aggressive enforcement program, California seems to
have achieved a high degree of compliance. Thus,
one could conclude that the same results could be
achieved in Texas and Arizona if the same level of
effort was expended. The situation on the Mexican
side of the border appears to be as inadequate as that
on much of the U.S. border area. Presently Mexican
officials have taken the stance that any inspection
activity will be directed toward carriers entering
Mexico, not leaving. This would seem to be a

short-sighted view since cooperation in enforcing
safety standards for motor carriers on both sides of
the border should result in safer highways for both
Mexico and the U.S..
On the surface, it would appear that increased
inspection levels would lead to greater numbers of
trucks being detained in inspection facilities. These
delays translate into additional costs to carriers and
shippers. However, the certainty of inspection and
resulting penalties for safety violations inherent in
increased inspection levels should encourage carriers
and operators to conform to safety regulations. The
present situation where traffic is restricted to a
narrow commercial zone disrupts U.S. and Mexican
firms who are unable to efficiently transport goods,
and motor carriers who are unable to compete in new
and potentially profitable markets. The question
that must be answered is what are the probable
consequences if the long-delayed opening of the ten
U.S. and Mexican border states is implemented.

Immediate Consequences of Expanding the
U.S./Mexican Commercial Zone
In the short term, the decision to open the
U.S./Mexican border to the free flow of
transportation will not necessarily change the way
things are being done. Several factors support this
argument. First, U.S. motor carriers have already
formed alliances with those Mexican carriers who
provide the best opportunities for mutually beneficial
relationships. These alliances would be adversely
affected if the U.S. carrier were to begin to compete
directly in the same freight lanes. In addition,
drivers for these U.S. carriers are ill-prepared to
operate in the Mexican environment with its unique
language, cultural, physical, and legal
characteristics. U.S. motor carriers are already
struggling with the task of maintaining a qualified
driver force to meet their present service needs and
might find it difficult to field the driver force
necessary to expand their service areas.
A second factor which would inhibit short-term
changes in cross-border transportation operations is
the nature of existing truck traffic.
The
preponderance of trucks originating in Mexico
engage in drayage operations. They are not poised
to capitalize on longer distance market opportunities
due to the nature of their business emphasis, the
inadequacy of their equipment, and the lack of
trained drivers capable of meeting U.S. licensing
standards.
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There are fears that if the next phase in the NAFTA
agreement were to be implemented that U.S. carriers
would hire large numbers of Mexican drivers to take
advantage of lower wage rates. In the short term
this does not seem to be feasible. Considering the
differences in driver education, training, and
licensing requirements, unfamiliarity with the
language, conventions, and safety regulations of the
U.S., and green card restrictions, it is unlikely that
U.S. motor carriers will be able to hire Mexican
drivers in any numbers. In fact, given the long term
nature of the driver shortage in the U.S., if hiring
Mexican drivers had been an acceptable option for
alleviating this situation, Mexican drivers would
already constitute a visible contingent of the U.S.
driver force.

Looking Toward the Future
In the long term, the element which seems to have
been overlooked by government officials and various
proponents and opponents to opening the border for
a free flow of motor carriers is the impact that the
market has on carrier performance. U.S. motor
carriers have found that safety plays an important
part in their bottom line performance (Siegel, 1992;
“Safety and Service,” 1990). This is due to direct
savings in driver turnover costs, insurance costs,
down-time costs, and fines. In addition there are
indirect benefits such as improved reputation and
the ability to meet shipper price and service
requirements. These same direct and indirect costs
and benefits apply to Mexican carriers. As existing
agreements between U.S. and Mexican carriers
expire, the possibility exists that U.S. carriers will
seize the opportunity for increased business if there
is a shortage of Mexican carriers that meet required
safety standards.
Perhaps there has been
insufficient effort made to emphasize the importance
of safety to the bottom line performance of the
carrier.
Viewing the market from the side of the shipper also
illustrates the impact that market forces have on a
carrier's motivation to maintain high safety
standards. As Mexican shippers become more
sophisticated and aware of what it takes to compete
on a NAFTA-wide basis, the importance of
transportation in the total logistics effort will become
apparent. Shippers can not, and will not, accept the
level of service that is provided by carriers that are
unable to maintain the prerequisite levels of safety
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performance. Trucks which are placed out-of-service
are less likely to provide the damage-free, reliable,
on-time service that shippers operating in time
sensitive environments require. Using unreliable
carriers would result in increased shipper costs due
to the need to carry higher inventory levels,
stock-outs and/or manufacturing interruptions. In
addition, as part of an integrated logistics program,
core carriers must be able to serve all of a shipper's
transportation needs, including cross-border
movements. In order to provide that service, the
carrier must meet the most stringent reliability
standards.
The realities of the market are that a carrier must be
competitive and capable of meeting shipper needs.
The market values high safety standards because of
the effect on operating efficiencies, e.g. time and
profits.
The government values high safety
standards because of the effect on public safety and
the integrity of the national infrastructure. Carriers
that do not meet these requirements will not be able
to operate profitably and thus will not remain in
business.
SUMMARY
The combination of stringent government
enforcement of safety standards and demand from
the market for damage-free shipments delivered on
an on-time basis provides the most effective means of
promoting carrier attention to safety. The drop in
the out-of-service rate for U.S. trucks from an
average of 40% to an average of 28% in the past ten
years can be attributed to this effect. It may be time
for motor carriers and shippers from both sides of the
border to take a leadership initiative, promoting the
free flow of goods throughout North America. The
market can serve to enforce safety requirements in
conjunction with governmental efforts. As high
safety standards provide a vital component of
profitable operations, carriers will be motivated to
maintain those standards to satisfy both
governmental regulations and shipper demands.
Those carriers who cannot remain competitive,
meeting shipper demands at a profit, will not be
tolerated in the marketplace. An understanding of
this linkage between the efforts of the government
and the market may provide a new perspective on
the decision of whether or not to extend the free flow
of truck operations to the ten border states and
eventually all of North America and beyond.
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